Overview
CVE-2026-25192 describes a flaw where WebSocket endpoints handling OCPP (Open Charge Point Protocol) traffic are exposed without authentication. An unauthenticated attacker can connect to the backend WebSocket endpoint using a known or discovered charging station identifier and impersonate that charger, sending or receiving OCPP commands as if it were legitimate. Because no authentication is required before upgrading to a WebSocket, this can lead to privilege escalation, unauthorized control of charging infrastructure, and corruption of charging network data reported to the backend. The weakness aligns with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
In Go (Gin) apps, this often manifests when developers expose a route like /ws/:stationId that upgrades to a WebSocket connection directly. An attacker can guess or enumerate station IDs and establish a WebSocket session without presenting valid credentials, enabling unauthorized access to the backend's OCPP handling logic and data.
Remediation involves enforcing authentication before WebSocket upgrade, binding the session to a verified station identity, and using secure transport. Implement token-based authentication (for example JWT) or mutual TLS, validate that the token's subject matches the stationId in the request, and reject mismatches. Additionally, apply origin checks, rate limiting, and auditing. Use TLS in production (WSS) and rotate keys regularly. These practices reduce the attack surface and align with secure-by-design principles for Open Charge Point Protocol integrations.
This guide provides Go (Gin) code illustrating a vulnerable pattern and a secure fix, with the fix gating the upgrade behind authentication and explicit stationId verification.
Code Fix Example
Go (Gin) API Security Remediation
Vulnerable pattern (Go/Gin) and fixed pattern (Go/Gin) shown together in a single file. The vulnerable handler upgrades to WebSocket without authentication; the fixed handler authenticates via JWT and validates the station identity before upgrading.
package main
import (
"fmt"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/gorilla/websocket"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
)
var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }, // insecure in production; constrain origins in real deployments
}
// Vulnerable: upgrades without authentication
func vulnerableWS(c *gin.Context) {
conn, err := upgrader.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer conn.Close()
for {
_, msg, err := conn.ReadMessage()
if err != nil {
break
}
// Echo back unauthenticated data
if err := conn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, msg); err != nil {
break
}
}
}
// Helper: verify a JWT token. In production, manage keys securely and rotate regularly
func verifyToken(tokenString string) (string, bool) {
if strings.TrimSpace(tokenString) == "" {
return "", false
}
token, err := jwt.Parse(tokenString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
if _, ok := token.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected signing method: %v", token.Header["alg"])
}
return []byte("mysecret"), nil
})
if err != nil || !token.Valid {
return "", false
}
if claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims); ok {
if sub, ok := claims["sub"].(string); ok {
return sub, true
}
}
return "", false
}
// Fixed: authentication before upgrade and stationId validation
func fixedWS(c *gin.Context) {
auth := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
tokenString := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer"))
stationID, ok := verifyToken(tokenString)
if !ok {
c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
if c.Param("stationId") != stationID {
c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
conn, err := upgrader.Upgrade(c.Writer, c.Request, nil)
if err != nil {
return
}
defer conn.Close()
for {
_, msg, err := conn.ReadMessage()
if err != nil {
break
}
out := []byte("[station:"+stationID+"] "+string(msg))
if err := conn.WriteMessage(websocket.TextMessage, out); err != nil {
break
}
}
}
func main() {
r := gin.Default()
r.GET("/ws/vulnerable/:stationId", vulnerableWS) // vulnerable: no auth
r.GET("/ws/fixed/:stationId", fixedWS) // fixed: auth before upgrade
log.Fatal(r.Run(":8080"))
}