Overview
CVE-2026-44547 describes a broken authentication scenario in a PHP-based project (ChurchCRM) where incomplete hardening of access controls allowed unauthorized access to user data despite authentication efforts. The advisory lists CWE-287 (Improper Authentication) and CWE-304, highlighting how portions of the application failed to enforce proper identity verification and authorization, enabling a PoC to bypass protections. The vulnerability affected ChurchCRM versions 7.2.0 through 7.2.2, where an attempted hardening commit was inadvertently stripped from the public routes, leaving shipped 7.2.x releases exploitable until the fix landed in 7.3.1. The description provided here uses those CVE references to illustrate how broken authentication can manifest and how a Go (Gin) implementation should guard against similar mistakes in a modern API.
In Go (Gin) contexts, broken authentication often arises when endpoints rely on client-provided identity or skip rigorous token validation and authorization checks. Common patterns include endpoints that accept a user identifier from the client (e.g., query param, path param) to fetch sensitive data, or middleware that does not validate tokens or sessions before granting access. A robust Gin-based service must enforce authentication on protected routes, validate tokens (e.g., JWTs) with a server-side signing key, and tie performed actions to the authenticated user rather than trusting input from the client. This remediation guide aligns with real-world CVE patterns by emphasizing explicit authorization, proper token validation, and secure session handling in Go.
This guide presents concrete Go (Gin) patterns to address broken authentication, including a side-by-side code example showing the vulnerable pattern and a secure fix, along with version guidance and step-by-step remediation steps to help developers implement resilient authentication in their Go services.
Affected Versions
7.2.0 - 7.2.2 (ChurchCRM); fixed in 7.3.1
Code Fix Example
Go (Gin) API Security Remediation
// Vulnerable pattern (Go + Gin): relies on client-provided identity without auth
package main
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
)
func main() {
r := gin.Default()
// Insecure: accepts a query parameter to select which profile to display
r.GET("/profile", func(c *gin.Context) {
user := c.Query("user") // attacker can request any user's data
// no authentication or authorization checks
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"user": user, "profile": "private-data"})
})
r.Run(":8080")
}
// Fixed version (Go + Gin): enforce authentication and authorize per-user data
package main
import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4"
)
var signingKey = []byte("CHANGE_ME")
func authMiddleware() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
auth := c.GetHeader("Authorization")
if !strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
tokenString := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
token, err := jwt.Parse(tokenString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
return signingKey, nil
})
if err != nil || !token.Valid {
c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
claims, _ := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
c.Set("user", claims["sub"])
c.Next()
}
}
func main() {
r := gin.Default()
r.Use(authMiddleware())
r.GET("/profile", func(c *gin.Context) {
user, _ := c.Get("user")
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{"user": user, "profile": "private-data"})
})
r.Run(":8080")
}