Overview
CVE-2026-26263 describes an unauthenticated time-based blind SQL injection in GLPI's search engine. An attacker could supply crafted input via the search endpoint and cause the database to respond differently in timing or data exposure, enabling data leakage and potentially broader access. The vulnerability (CWE-89) is mitigated by removing unsafe dynamic SQL. The specific GLPI fix was released in 11.0.6. Although this CVE points to a PHP application, the injection pattern it exemplifies is universal: untrusted input flows into SQL strings. In Go apps using the Gin framework, similar risk arises when you concatenate user input into SQL rather than using parameter binding. If a handler reads a query parameter (for example, q) and builds a query by string interpolation, an attacker can craft payloads that alter the intended query logic (CWE-89).
In Go (Gin) code, the impact can be as severe as data exposure or manipulation if search-like endpoints or any endpoint using user input to filter results are vulnerable. Time-based techniques are less common in Go demos because parameterized queries prevent the timing differences attackers rely on, but the core risk remains: building SQL with untrusted input. This guide shows how to recognize and remediate such patterns, aligning with the CVE’s lessons while providing Go-centric fixes.
To fix this in Go (Gin), always use parameterized queries and avoid building SQL by concatenating strings from user input. Prefer prepared statements or an ORM that binds values safely. When dynamic conditions are necessary (e.g., dynamic WHERE clauses), validate inputs against a whitelist, and construct SQL using bound parameters rather than interpolating arbitrary strings. Adopt least-privilege DB users, timeouts, and proper error handling to further reduce risk. Finally, add tests and security checks to ensure new changes stay injection-resistant.
Code example below shows a vulnerable pattern versus a secure pattern in a single Gin app. The vulnerable route concatenates the user input into SQL, while the fixed route uses a parameterized query, illustrating how to eliminate the injection surface in real Go (Gin) projects.
Affected Versions
GLPI 11.0.0-11.0.5 (CVE-2026-26263); Go Gin equivalents: N/A
Code Fix Example
Go (Gin) API Security Remediation
package main
import (
"database/sql"
"log"
"net/http"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
_ "github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql"
)
func main() {
// Connect to DB (use real credentials and schema in production)
db, err := sql.Open("mysql", "user:pass@tcp(localhost:3306)/shop")
if err != nil {
log.Fatal(err)
}
defer db.Close()
r := gin.Default()
// Vulnerable endpoint: builds SQL with string concatenation from user input
r.GET("/search", func(c *gin.Context) {
q := c.Query("q")
// Vulnerable pattern: user input is interpolated directly into SQL
vulnerableQuery := "SELECT id, name FROM items WHERE name LIKE '%' + '" + q + "' + '%'"
// Note: depending on driver, string concatenation may vary; the key point is unsafely building SQL
rows, err := db.Query(vulnerableQuery)
if err != nil {
c.String(http.StatusInternalServerError, "error executing query")
return
}
rows.Close()
c.String(http.StatusOK, "vulnerable search attempted")
})
// Fixed endpoint: uses parameterized queries
r.GET("/search_fixed", func(c *gin.Context) {
q := c.Query("q")
// Safe: bind user input as a parameter
rows, err := db.Query("SELECT id, name FROM items WHERE name LIKE ?", "%"+q+"%")
if err != nil {
c.String(http.StatusInternalServerError, "error executing query")
return
}
rows.Close()
c.String(http.StatusOK, "fixed search executed")
})
r.Run()
}